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SPENCER'S PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DECLINE 
 
OF UTILITARIAN PREMISES IN BRITISH PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
Gavin Bissell 
University of Bradford. 
 
Despite the revival of interest in nineteenth century psychology and ethics in Britain 
during the 1980s, and the current debate around Utilitarian ethics in medicine (Buckle, 
2005) and care (Offer, 2004), Utilitarian premises, understood as a psychological 
theory rather than as a moral philosophy, remain largely dormant in contemporary 
British Psychology. This is so despite their apparent survival in Behaviourism (Plaud 
& Vogeltanz, 1994).  
 
This article examines aspects of their decline within Victorian psychology, by 
focussing upon the relatively neglected psychological writings of Herbert Spencer. In 
doing so, it seeks to make a modest contribution to unravelling the complex changes 
in the nature of nineteenth-century psychology. In particular it is argued that, whilst 
some explanations of the decline of Utilitarian premises in the Victorian development 
of psychology focus upon the later part of the century and cultural or institutional 
factors, an examination of Spencer's works at the mid-century supports the view that 
changes were under way earlier. Whilst several explanations might be offered for this, 
changes in economic organisation and in the experience of individual agency are 
highlighted.  
 
The relation between Utilitarian psychology and Utilitarian ethics will then be 
considered. Finally, at this stage it should be possible to comment upon the 
significance of the marginalization of Utilitarian premises within the development of 
Victorian psychology for the contemporary debate about health resource allocation.  
    
If Herbert Spencer's system of synthetic philosophy is chiefly remembered, if it is 
remembered at all, as the ‘wrong’ theory of evolution, and if his sociology stands 
condemned for its glaring ethnocentrism, then we cannot wonder to find his 
Principles of Psychology receiving limited attention, despite the renewal of study in 
the development of psychology suggested by the formation of the History and 
Philosophy Section of the British Psychological Society in 1987. 
 
Without laying claim to anything more than a minor footnote to the history of British 
psychology, however, it might nonetheless be suggested that the neglected 1855 
Principles signify an important transition within the discipline during the nineteenth 
century as a whole. It might not be going too far to say that the Principles perhaps 
represented, on one hand, the last major expression of British psychology's direct 
formulation of mental phenomena in terms of activity; and on the other, an expression 
of its emerging interest in mental structure, during the nineteenth century. [OK to run 
on?] This, at least, may be its illustrative value today, even though there may be other 
Victorian texts of significance here (for example Bain, 1855, 1859), and it is perhaps 
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true that Spencer was not a great innovator in this field (Murray, 1929). 
 
In the following discussion, ways in which the Principles might illustrate these 
changing interests will be examined, and their place within the wider corpus of 
Spencer's ideas discussed: Spencer’s psychological ideas tend to overflow into his 
sociology, in particular. More generally, it will be argued that the ambience of feeling 
about individual agency may be a useful key to understanding the place occupied by 
the Principles in the Victorian development of psychology. 
 
The displacement of Utilitarian premises by Spencer can be seen as an important step 
in the development of the new interest in cognitive structure, and appears in a 
particularly succinct and unceremonious manner in his 1857 essay Progress: Its Law 
and Cause. Here Spencer displaces the conception of Man as motivated by drives 
towards the satisfaction of wants (and thereby towards greater happiness) into a side 
position, joining to it a picture of cognitive and other structures that [if the clause this 
introduces cannot be deleted, i.e. it’s integral to the meaning, then it’s ‘that’ and not 
‘which’] stresses the differentiation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous. 
 
By placing the emphasis upon the development of structures, per se, rather than upon 
the consequences of activity in the world for individual interests and desires, he clears 
the way for an analysis of mental structure which decentres the Utilitarian psychology 
of pleasure and pain. The significance of this transition becomes more apparent when 
the broader detail of both Spencerian and Utilitarian theory is examined. 
 
Utilitarian psychology fitted into the political economy of the early nineteenth century. 
Such interpenetration is found in, for example, the work of James Mill, often 
considered the doyen, though perhaps not the leading intellect, of political economy at 
this time (Winch, 1966); his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829) 
and his Elements of Political Economy (1821) are works of this kind. In the Analysis 
appears a psychology of the individual of the 'heroic age' (Checkland, 1959) of British 
capitalism, a psychology which is of a piece with the picture of active individual 
expansion of capital presented in the Elements. 
 
Spencer's Principles, on the other hand, depict a psychology which, within the Statics 
(1851), met political economy much more tangentially. Individual expansion of 
wealth is no longer regarded as the primum mobile of beneficial change and harmony, 
and the principle of functional adaptation of social entity to environment through 
structural differentiation has taken its place. It is therefore not surprising to find in the 
Principles an emphasis upon functional adaptation of the individual to environment 
through differentiation of the structure of cognition. Checkland (1959) has observed 
of this period that its economic sense registered a 'movement from below', a general 
development of production itself; Spencer's stress upon increasing differentiation of 
function as the primum mobile of social change perhaps corresponds to this. There is a 
mass of material that could be drawn in here, if space permitted. The annals of the 
economic section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, for 
example, contain some candid references to these changes (Author, 1986). 
 
In short, the structure of cognition became an object of new interest to the nineteenth 
century just at the time at which the role of the individual as an agent in social change 
was de-emphasised. It is as though the current of social change now flows alongside 
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the individual, who participates in, but is not central to it, and at this moment mental 
structure becomes an independent object of study of especial interest. 
 
Despite this de-emphasis of individual agency, however, activity retains a primary 
position in Spencer's Principles of Psychology, the position it had occupied in Mill's 
Analysis. Following Aristotelian tradition, Mill linked the important perceptions of 
time and space to motion, stressing, however, the significance of activity. From the 
experience of muscular resistance we derive the ideas of extension and motion; the 
action of our own bodies, the feelings which attend muscular action, underpin them. 
The idea of time arises from the succession of antecedents and consequents, cause and 
effect in actions. 
 
Spencer, too, deduces that the experience of muscular resistance within activity is of 
cardinal significance, since it produces the mode of consciousness to which all others 
are reducible: time, space, and motion rest upon it. For example (Principles 1855:253):  
"It follows that that which is required to produce changes of state, is that through 
which time is disclosed." Of course, there are differences here: Spencer is more 
concerned with collisions with the world than was Mill, who restricted himself more 
to antecedent and consequent, pleasure and pain within actions involving motive and 
interest of the individual, a difference which reflects the more general displacement of 
Utilitarian premises by Spencer. 
 
Spencer continued the practice, then, of allotting to activity a cardinal role in 
psychology. But what became of Spencer’s Utilitarianism (Parsons, 1937)? Many 
British works that succeeded the Principles in the late nineteenth century tended to 
throw more effort into the analysis of the structure of cognition and to drop the 
insistence upon the role of activity altogether. Hence when, for example, the Oxford 
philosopher Leonard Hobhouse wrote his Theory of Knowledge towards the end of the 
century he could say with Shadworth Hodgson (and William James for that matter) 
that the centrally important experience of time was simply a given, a structure of 
consciousness even, something not to be explained in terms of physical activity 
certainly. (With regard to the overlap with James, see also Stout, 1899. Stout’s 
rejection of James Mill’s associationism is interesting too in this respect). 
 
 When the wider outline of Hobhouse's ideas is examined it becomes a little easier to 
see what had happened to Spencer's Principles. Hobhouse was part of an intellectual 
milieu which included the Webbs, Bosanquet, and the architects of social policy in the 
early years of the twentieth century, most of whom set their faces resolutely away 
from Utilitarianism (Offer, 2004). Hobhouse's social philosophy, presented in The 
Labour Movement (1893), depicts progress as a product of collective moral reasoning 
acting through the state and piecemeal social reform, rather than as the product of 
general evolutionary tendencies of structural differentiation and adaptation operating 
at the level of the social organism. It is certainly a very long way from Mill's progress 
through the individual pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain: neither material 
activity nor individual agency occupies a driving seat in Hobhouse's social philosophy 
in the way they did for Mill. 
 
Arguably, then, Spencer's Principles of Psychology were no longer relevant by 1900 
because it now seemed much more difficult to speak about the place of individual 
activity in progress at all, let alone the sort of individual agency that even Spencer had 
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dropped in favour of a sort of automatic progress with general activity. Indeed, it was 
just this latter sort of progress, asserted Hobhouse in The Labour Movement, that no-
one believed in any more, now that the mid-Victorian period of active proprietorial 
capitalism was being overshadowed by the complex reality of international finance, 
and Rentier capitalism was numbing the outline and relatively simple predictability of 
sweat-and-smoke production. Again, although there is not space for a detailed 
exposition here, it is instructive to read the passing comment of the period, for 
example reflected in the letters pages of the textile press (especially during the years 
of the 1873–1896 depression of trade), and in the writings by contemporary 
commentators in journals such as The Nineteenth Century. They are starkly different 
from those of commentators writing in, say, The Edinburgh Journal half a century 
earlier on the experience of trade. (Author, 1986).  
 
It might be objected that the economically active class and its spokespersons in the 
later nineteenth century did not overlap with that of the writers of psychology texts in 
the ways that it did in the days of James Mill and The Political Economy Club, to 
which club David Ricardo and Nassau Senior belonged, or as it did in the days of 
Spencer and his circle, which included the Strutts of Derby and other social and 
economic thinkers. If this were so, then there might be no reason to expect any 
harmony at all between psychological theory and the experience of economic agency 
in the later nineteenth century. 
 
This is debatable. On one hand, economists and psychologists were increasingly 
likely to be found sequestered inside the walls of traditional academic establishments, 
isolated from one another’s work.  On the other hand, the enlarged passive share-
ownership class increasingly formed the milieu which supported reflection and theory. 
One can but point to similarities between psychological theory, economic theory, and 
the experience of agency reflected in the literature of the period.   
 
One of the few remaining attractions of Spencer's Principles of Psychology in this 
changed climate was perhaps the study of cognitive structure, with some sort of 
pragmatic reworking to drop the assumption of growing harmony, the theory of 
development and the increasingly suspect assumption that activity underpinned any 
cognitive appropriation of the world that was of much use. It seems likely therefore 
that Spencer's Principles of Psychology floundered because, as Hawthorn (1976) has 
contended concerning Spencer's social philosophy, they reflected an attempt at certain 
knowledge of an entire structure; and by the 1890s fewer people possessed either the 
same confidence in their knowledge of the working of wholes, or in this certain 
knowability. An emerging or even common experience, perhaps, was one of limited 
ability to make any great penetration of, or impact upon, the order of things – ‘a 
certain helplessness’ as Hobhouse called it – coupled with a doubt that the general 
movement of things was of an unambiguously predictable character. A more 
reasonable approach in psychology was seen to be that of piecemeal research into 
cognitive structure (as opposed to Spencer's more obviously synthetic - deductive 
approach) and the construction of bodies of theory by the method of consilience, in 
which concepts in one theory are supported by concepts in other theoretical domains, 
or even in other disciplines ( Hobhouse’s Theory of Knowledge, 1896). 
 
It might be objected that the movement away from activity in psychology had less to 
do with changes in the ambient sense of agency, and more to do with an increase in 
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the perceived attractiveness of the leisure lifestyle of the British aristocracy (Wiener, 
1981). Or, perhaps, that psychology moved out of the hands of self-educated 
provincials like Spencer and returned, with psychologists such as James and Stout, 
behind the walls of traditional intellectual establishments (Kumar, 1981). 
 
It is interesting in this connection to examine the psychological writings of George 
Lewes, a member of Spencer’s circle at the mid-century, a prolific writer and not a 
university intellectual, but one whose writings departed critically from Spencer’s 
when they were published posthumously a quarter of a century later (The Study of 
Psychology, 1879). Perhaps it should be noted that this appeared as volume 4 of the 
five-volume Problems of Life and Mind, a series which began appearing in 1873, 
Lewes dying in 1878..  Like Spencer, Lewes in his earlier work explicitly excluded 
metaphysical explanations in general, and those of Hegel in particular (Tjoa, 1977), 
but in his later work he brings in the concept of the general mind as a source for 
aspects of experience that could not be derived by way of the Utilitarian psychology 
found elsewhere in The Study of Psychology, a concept which earlier might have been 
deemed Idealist, if not suspiciously metaphysical. Seen in this way, the social thus 
appears as something not external and offering resistance to the individual, but as an 
integral part of the human mind, part of its inner construction. He also refers to the 
concept of motivation by unconscious desires, arguably a further step towards a new 
consideration of mental structure. 
 
 
 But it is here especially that the study of Spencer's Principles of Psychology 
becomes most useful, since the movement away from the centrally active individual 
signified by Spencer's displacement of Utilitarian principles is obviously not 
explicable in terms of either of these arguments (i.e., of Wiener or of Kumar), which 
refer only to the late part of the century. There is plainly, with the shift of interest 
toward cognitive structure illustrated by Spencer's Principles of Psychology, some 
sort of reappraisal of the role of individual pursuit and individual agency much earlier 
in the century. 
 
   
 
For this reason, it is tempting to view the increase of interest in cognitive structure in 
works that succeeded Spencer's Principles of Psychology as an indication of a further 
reappraisal of the agency of the individual; in short, one of the things that arguably led 
to Spencer's displacement of Utilitarian psychology perhaps in turn led to the 
rejection of his Principles of Psychology too. 
 
In short, the significance of Spencer's Principles of Psychology in the Victorian 
development of psychology can perhaps be a little better appreciated by a glance at 
some of his other ideas and their sympathy, and discord, with the ambience of feeling 
about individual agency within his lifetime. This need not be understood as a 
suggestion that Spencer's Principles of Psychology were anything less than an attempt 
at a scientific psychology; rather, that they were the product of a scientific civilisation 
at a time when the individual was just beginning to occupy a modem place within it.  
 
We can at this point return, however briefly, to the contemporary context, where the 
impact of this conclusion upon the debate around the use of Utilitarian ethics as a 
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means of resource allocation in medicine and social care can now be assessed. Plaud 
& Vogeltanz (1994) have referred to Spencer’s ‘ethical naturalism’ and have 
questioned the appropriateness of applying it in social policy, whilst Buckle (2005) 
has traced ethical naturalism to Utilitarianism, where he detects irreconcilable 
principles. The argument is about whether the ‘ought’ can be derived from the ‘is’. In 
Utilitarian (Mill’s) terms, individual interest provides the volition in linking 
antecedent with consequent: what is good is what is pleasant to the individual, and 
ultimately for society, because if others are harmed by it, this ultimately rebounds 
upon the individual, reducing his/her pleasure. It is necessary only that the 
consequences of individual action are present to the individual, and that he/she 
reasonably pursues consequences from antecedents. Hence the psychological theory 
of associationism links directly with the moral philosophy of Utilitarianism.  
 
Although, as Plaud & Vogeltanz (1994) argue, Spencer remains an ethical naturalist, 
nonetheless the foregoing argument has I hope shown that Spencer’s associationism 
has moved away from Mill’s in the mid-nineteenth century, despite the continued 
importance of activity in his psychology. There is also a suggestion that the moral 
becomes that which is in line with progress from the simple to the heterogeneous and 
from the contingent to the adapted, rather than simply being the individual’s struggle 
with agreeable and disagreeable sensations writ large. Another way of putting this 
might be to say that the ethical naturalism of Utilitarianism, whatever its intrinsic 
contradiction between Humean and Kantian conceptions of reason (Buckle, 2005), 
seems to have enjoyed a certain appeal in the early nineteenth century amongst 
industrialists (Bain, 1882).  
 
By mid-century, however, experiences of individual agency were somewhat different, 
and the changes are registered in Spencer’s reworked associationism, even though 
activity continues to play a major role. As the century unfolds, psychological writing 
moves away from Spencer’s physical evolutionism and further displaces activity. 
Spencer’s criticisms of Bain’s Emotions and the Will (1860) essentially chide Bain for 
‘inductivism’ in the classification of the emotions, and for what Spencer perceived to 
be Bain’s failure to adopt a proper evolutionary developmental perspective, reducing 
the will to a simple volitional concept.    
      
 By the late nineteenth century, Spencer’s physical- evolutionary approach, in which 
activity continued to occupy a significant place, and his ethical naturalism, are 
increasingly displaced in Britain by ethical Idealism (Offer, 2004), and by the 
consilience-based approaches to cognitive structure and behaviour referred to earlier. 
 
It would be myopic to leave this consideration of the role of Spencer’s psychology in 
the Victorian development of psychology, however, without acknowledging its 
relation to the history of evolutionary psychology, and without acknowledging the 
impact of Darwin’s work on the psychology that succeeded Spencer’s. What has 
come to be known as Spencer’s social Darwinism was a key part of his reformulated 
associationism (Rose & Rose, 2000). His move away from classical Utilitarian 
psychology thus also pointed him towards an evolutionary psychology, although not 
in the form that was developed in the twentieth century (see for example Pinker, 1994; 
Buss, 2008). There is hence the paradox that, if Spencer’s psychology demonstrates 
the inappropriateness of resurrecting Utilitarian ethical naturalism, it at the same time 
presents an evolutionary psychology (in Spencer’s terms) argument for a type of 
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ethical naturalism.  
 
Summarizing the argument as a whole, it has been suggested that whilst Utilitarian 
ethical justifications for resource allocation – in which, for example, a formula is 
advanced for calculation of cost-benefit in terms of individual quality of life: years 
gained for a given procedure or treatment – have been criticized for their conflation of 
‘is ‘and ‘ought’, and for their confusion of Humean and Kantian conceptions of 
reason, other criticisms may be made. In particular, it is suggested here that Utilitarian 
premises can be seen to be of their time, and an analysis of the position of Spencer’s 
Principles of Psychology in the Victorian development of psychology has been 
advanced in support of this suggestion. 
 
The ethical naturalism of Mill’s Utilitarianism can be seen to be of a piece with his 
associationism, and to be the accompaniment of a particular experience of individual 
agency in the early part of the nineteenth century. Spencer’s psychology at the mid-
century perhaps illustrates the impermanence of that experience, even though it 
retains an emphasis upon individual activity and ethical naturalism.  
 
 Finally, Spencer’s differences from the psychology of Bain and Lewes were seen to 
presage the displacement of ethical naturalism and the emerging ethical idealism of 
Hobhouse and others, in the later nineteenth century. This latter development is 
accompanied by a revived concept of the general will, and by consilience approaches 
to the investigation of mental phenomena and behaviour, and perhaps accompanied 
further changes in the experience of individual agency, suggesting its marginalization. 
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